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1 Introduction
When your car breaks down, most of us need to consult an expert. The
expert is able to perform a diagnosis and then suggests repair to fix the
problem. Besides defrauding the customer by suggesting unnecessary repairs,
the expert may also invest only little effort in diagnosis and simply suggest
and provide more demanding and often unnecessary repairs, which fix minor
as well as major problems that both may have been the reason for the break-
down. In this paper we want to study this type of fraud and how it affects
market out comes and what remedies exist.
Repair services are credence goods. Their main characteristic is that con-
sumers do not know the exact quality of good or service they need, whereas
an expert seller can determine the most efficient quality to cure the customers
problem. Darby and Karni (1973) added credence goods to Nelson’s (1970)
classification of ordinary, search and experience goods. Several informational
problems arise: 1. the expert may on purpose provide a wrong treatment
because he makes a higher profit doing so; 2. it is possible that the expert
can misdiagnose the problem and 3. the expert may save on diagnosis effort
and instead of investing effort just provide a treatment without diagnosis. A
series of papers (see the survey by Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2005) studied
these goods in a context where experts diagnosis is free or errors and without
the hidden action problem with respect to diagnosis. In this paper we want
to introduce the possiblity that experts can unobserved refrain from investing
effort and that they never recognize the quality needed with certainty.
With credence goods it may well be the case that market institutions
provide the experts with incentives to treat consumers efficiently. But also
the opposite behavior may appear, namely that experts provide inefficiently
- either too high or too low quality, or that experts may have an incentive to
charge for a more expensive quality than they actually provide. Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2005) show, if consumers are homogeneous, and they cannot
reject treatment after diagnosis, and either a sort of liability ensures sufficient
treatment or consumers and courts are able to verify the provided quality of
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treatment then the market ensures efficiency. But, this result hinges on the
assumption that, on the one hand diagnosis comes for free (or there exists a
fair price paid by the consumer to the expert) and diagnosis is perfect. In this
article we relax the assumption of a perfect diagnosis as well as that diagnosis
is costless and verifiable. We ask how and whether compensation payments
ensure efficiency by serving as a device to ensure liablity. We show that
innefficient supply of expensive treatment will arise as well as inefficient high
levels of diagnosis effort if compensation payments are too high and if they do
not go in full to the insufficiently treated consumer. The cost of compensation
payments to customers who received insufficient treatments usually exceeds
the pur transfer. The handling of compensation causes overhead costs and
the event results often in a loss of reputation to the expert. Both of these
additional costs are external to the business relation between the expert and
the customer.
Moral hazard in markets for diagnosis and treatment are studied empiri-
cally by Hubbard (1998). Hubbard observes in the vehicle inspection market
that experts have an incentive to “fake” diagnosis results to maximize prof-
its. He claims that this misrepresentation of diagnosis is often due to profit
maximizing behavior and not due to a stochastic misdiagnosis. In the health
industry misdiagnosis is referred to as medical malpractice whenever the
physician did not invest ‘due care’ in diagnosing the patient. Danzon (2000)
provides a survey of the issues involveld in liability for medical malpractice.
In the health market, stochastic misdiagnosis seems to be more often a rea-
son for wrong diagnosis and the probability of such a misdiagnosis is affected
by the effort invested by the expert. Thornton (1999) observes that higher
compensation payments increase the length of time physicians invest in diag-
nosing consumers. Levinson et al. (1997) show that this reduces significantly
the malpractice claims status of a physician. Wachsmann (1993) supports
this by showing that 70% of malpractive lawsuits involve physician failure to
take adequate time to perform examinations, obtain medical histories, and
be present when needed. Thornton (1999) also cites evidence from medical
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society surveys (CIS OTA, 1994) which report that phyisicians suggest more
diagnostic tests, procedures and follow-up visits, and spend extra time with
patients as well as keeping more detailed records to avoid future malpractice
claims when claims are higher. Thornton (1997) makes the point that time
spent on defensive medical intervention, either treatments or additional di-
agnosis time comes at the cost of non-defensive medical activities, i.e. it uses
up valuable resources.
But also evidence for liability induced demand - overtreatment - can be
found. Localio et al. (1993) use data from 31 New York Hospitals in 1984 to
show that the use of caesarean section is significantly positively affected by
the risk of a malpractice suits and the prior claim history of hospitals and
medical staff where the physician works.
We also ask the question whether and how the state should interfere.
What are the effects of costs arising to the expert that are not paid out as
compensation to consumers? Should there be a penalty paid by the expert
in case of failing treatment that may be due to misdiagnosis? Or can we
leave compensation payments to the market such that efficient outcomes are
generated?
Any payment levied on experts has usually two components: A transfer
from the expert to the undertreated customer and some sort of external cost,
for exampe the administration of compensation claims as well as a loss of
reputation. Whereas experts may be able to insure themselves against mon-
etary costs, as in the case of malpractice insurance, reputation costs and the
time spent dealing with claims of customers (for example administration and
consultations with lawyers to defend oneself) are uninsurable (Danzon et al.,
1990). But even the insurable costs will affect expert decisions, experience
rating by insurance companies will increase in the cost for insurance. Experts
have to carry these costs in cases of misdiagnosis at least partially, indepen-
dent of whether they invest in diagnosis, i.e. behave “honestly”, or not. If
payments in case of a failing treatment are too large, experts have incentives
to overtreat customers to avoid such payments. We show that, if it is efficient
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to follow the experts diagnosis, then the payment cannot be infinite because
otherwise induced demand results due to the high payment. This, in our
eyes, may be one reason for the high costs of the american health system
where compensation payments are high compared to the european system,
where compensation payments are limited. Anderson and Poullier (1999)
document that the total amount of this part of health expenditure in 1990
was in the US almost three (two) times as the total amount spent in the
UK (Canada), relative to GDP, the US spends twice (1.5 times) as much as
the UK (Canada). Danzon (1990) documents that malpractice suits are five
to six times more likely in the US compared to Canada and the UK and at
the same time awards are larger by some extent. For Danzon et al. (1990)
induced overtreatment, i.e. unnecessary increases in the quality of provided
medical treatments, is one reason for increased health expenditure causedby
higher medical malpractice awards. They also name increases in the fees
charged by experts (physicians in their context) because of limited compe-
tition or risk aversion by utility maximizing agents as reasons for increased
health expenditure.
That treatments might fail is not new in the literature on credence goods.
Glazer and McGuire (1996), Boukaert and Degryse (2000) and Emons (2000)
study the case of risky vs. safe sellers of credence goods. In their papers
two types of sellers exist, where one of them can only provide high quality
treatments with an exogenousely given proabablity. In our model, not the
provision of high quality is unsafe but the diagnosis might fail. This gener-
ates the problem, that even with the effort to diagnose a customer invested,
the diagnosis might fail and thus experts can be failing to provide sufficient
quality. Misdiagnosis probablity is only studied in models of physician be-
havior. Jelovac (2001) and Marinoso and Jelovac (2003) are two examples.
Both papers incorporate effort decisions by the expert to observe the treat-
ment needed but assume that consumers face one period losses if the expert
fails to diagnose correctly and that experts may have to provide a second
treatment if the first treatment fails without being paid. No further com-
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pensation or penalty has to be paid by the expert. We study explicitly the
effects of malpractice liability and derive conditions such that it is always
efficient that experts invest diagnosis effort instead of making a blind sug-
gestion for one treatment and characterize prices to be paid to experts such
that systematic overtreatment is avoided and experts actually invest efficient
effort to diagnose customers.
The effort to investment in diagnosis is also studied by Pesendorfer and
Wolinsky (2003). They provide a model, where only with effort by both
experts two experts can arrive at the same diagnosis. Therefore, the search
for multiple opinions guarantees diagnosis effort in equilibrium and can be
used in equilibrium. In their model misdiagnosis is ruled out as well as two
expert accidently agreeing without effort on the same diagnosis. In our model
all experts can fail, independent on how much effort they invest.
The article proceeds with introducing a simple model of possible misdi-
agnosis. In section 3 we study cases of unobservable diagnosis effort and a
fixed misdiagnosis probability. Section 4 then looks at the case of an endoge-
nous choice of diagnosis effort determining the probability of of misdiagnosis.
Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Misdiagnosis
The economy consists of homogenous customers and there is free entry of
experts.
The customer has with probability h a major problem, denoted c, and
with probability 1−h an minor problem, denoted c. Let 0 <c< c denote also
the cost of treatment. Customers live for two periods. They derive utility
v when treated efficiently in period one. If a mechanic fixes your car, you
can drive it in the next week and you derive utility from the working car
in the future weeks. If a customer does not undergo treatment, he receives
utility zero and the game ends. If the treatment is not sufficient in period
one, the customer forgoes v for the first period. He then knows that c fixes
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Customer’s utility Customer needs
c c
Customer c v 0
gets c v v
Table 1: Utility from a Credence Good
the problem which he then receives at the end of period at marginal costs.1
We assume that at marginal cost it is efficient to undergo treatment even
for the utility derived in one period only (v > c). It may happen that when
not sufficiently served by the mechanic, your car does not work this week
(a second repair is needed) but then it will work for sure. To simplify the
analysis we assume that discounting does not matter.
Customers can obserserve and verify the quality they receive. But, they
only find out whether the received quality was the needed one when receiving
low quality when high quality was needed. Table 1 gives the gros payoff to
customers given the quality needed and that provided.
Experts are able to diagnose a customers problem. With certainty they
recognize the minor problem as such. With probability 1 − σ = Pr(γ =c|c)
they misdiagnose a customer who needs the major treatment as a customer
needing the minor one, i.e. they receive signal γ =c when the customer has
problem c. In the analysis, rely also need another probability, namely, the
probability that a customer has a major problem when the expert actually
observes a minor signal, we denote this probability as 1 − α, it is given as
1− α = h(1−σ)
h(1−σ)+(1−h) . We assume that experts maximize their payoff. If they
are indifferent between which treatment to provide, they decide in the best
interest of the customer.
To keep the problem interesting, we assume that it is efficient that ex-
1This assumption sounds unrealistic at first. As will be seen below, in equilibrium
experts will sell c at marginal cost. Alternatively, Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2004) provide
a model where experts face competition by discounters who, in equilibrium, sell c at
marginal costs.
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perts invest effort and follow the signal they receive: If they receive a minor
signal, to provide the minor treatment, that is (c− c) ≥ (1− α)(v + c). The
interpretation of the condition is, that the signal the expert receives is in-
formative enough given the expected costs the low quality treatment causes
due to misdiagnosis. For the case of risk avers customers some of the results
below yield unique solutions. We do not specify risk aversion in more detail
but we assume thatit is not too strong, or, that an experts’ signal is strong
enough even if a risk premium for the event of misdiagnosis is included to
rule out the case that a customer has an interest that always c is applied.
Whenever the a prescribed minor treatment fails the expert has to pay
the sum t = θ + l, where θ represents a pure transfers form the expert to
her consumer in case of a failing treatment and l represents the additional
costs, including administration costs, judicial expenses and loss of reputation,
pure losses to both parties. Note, we assume that whenever treatment fails
the expert is liable to pay t. This is different from standard models of tort
law. Our model assume that courts can only verify that a treatment failed
and in this case allocate t. In traditional models of tort law or malpractice
awards, courts observe whether the expert exerted due care and allocate
compensation arcordingly. We believe that this observation is not perfect.
That is whenever the expert sold an insufficient treatment he has to pay
an expected sum t. The courts decides randomly whether or not a (higher)
compensation is awarded. Note however, we implicitly assume that whether
experts invested a lot of care or only little care does not affect the expected
payment.
Before proceeding, we introduce further notation, we denote by p, p the
prices posted, and by ∆ = p− c,∆ = p− c the mark-ups for quality c, c.
We further assume that both customers and expert cannot committ to
undergo treatment. This implies prices must provide the expert with incen-
tives to sell both goods after diagnosis as well as the customers need to prefer
to buy the advised quality to rejecting treatment after receiving the experts
advice. For the expert it is necessary that prices cover cost, because the ex-
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pert cannot be forced to provide a quality after diagnosis, thus ∆,∆ > 0. We
refer to these restrictions as the experts’ commitment conditions below. We
also assume that the consumer cannot be forced to follow experts advice, i.e.
they can choose to buy c when adviced to buy c or they can refuse treatment
at all. For the case of θ = 0 this implies p ≤ p.
There is free entry into and exit from this market. Thus prices must be
such that experts make neither losses nor profits in equilibrium.
3 Overtreatment and Compensation
Let us consider the behavior of an expert. The expert has not to follow the
signal, that is whenever he receives a minor signal he can either provide a
minor treatment or he can provide a major one.
From the credence goods literature we know that the expert has an incen-
tive to set equal mark-up prices if customers can verify the quality delivered
whenever his signal is perfect. This is independent of some payment t that he
has to pay in case the treatment fails. If his diagnosis ist failable, a liability
rule, forcing him to pay some punishment t changes incentives. Most im-
portant, to not diagnose a customer and always provide c generates a profit
whenever ∆ > 0. Thus in equilibrium ∆ = 0. The mark-ups have to fulfill
two constraints, first they have to ensure that the expert provides the minor
treatment given the signal he receives and second, they need to ensure that
the expert provides the major treatment when receiving the major signal, i.e.
the profit generated on selling c cannot be to large. We record this result in
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The expert will provide a diagnosis and a treatment as determined
by the signal he receives, only iff (1− α)t ≤ ∆−∆ ≤ t.
Proof. Consider the case, where the expert receives the signal γ = c. In
this case, his choice is to sell c and generate the profit ∆. Given that every
customer with γ = c has for sure a major problem, implies that the expert,
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providing a minor treatment, incures for sure a punishment. Hence, providing
c generates a profit of ∆− t. This profit needs to be lower than ∆ to provide
the incentives for efficient behavior in case of γ = c. Next consider the case
γ =c. In this case the expert compares the payoff in case of providing c with
the payoff providing c, facing the risk to pay a penalty later: ∆ ≤ ∆−(1−α)t.
Both incentive constraints yield together the double inequality stated in the
lemma.
This lemma shows that if mark-up differences are constrained either by
the market or by institutional rules, the punishment should neither be too
low nor too high. Given the lack of committment of the expert it is necessary
that prices cover cost: ∆,∆ ≥ 0. The costs for liability payments have to
be carried by the low cost treatment, at the same time customers are free to
buy high quality if they want to. Prices and compensation payments have
to be such, that they provide incentives to customers to buy c when adviced
to do so, otherwise the expert has no incentive to diagnose a customer. This
rational leads to the next result.
Proposition 1 If and only if the external loss to both parties ist too high,
l > (c−c)
1−α −v, then no equilibrium with efficient treatment exists, given experts
cannot commit to sell below cost and customers are not committed to buy low
quality.
Proof. Markups ∆ = 0 and ∆ = (1−α)(l+θ) cover costs for the expert and
provide incentives not to cheat on diagnosis effort. Customer c when adviced
to do so iff αv + (1− α)θ − p ≤ v − p⇔ (c− c)− (1− α)(v − θ) ≥ ∆−∆.
Replacing ∆ by (1− α)(l + θ) and rearranging yields that such prices exist
for any θ if l ≤ (c−c)
1−α − v.
Given that for any θ an equilibrium with efficient service exists, experts
will choose θ such that t is large enough to avoid cheating on the diagnosis.
If customers are risk averse then θ = v. These prices maximize consumer
welfare whenever α is high enough such that customers prefer the risk of
misdiagnogis in case c is adviced over buying c directly.
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4 Cheating on Diagnosis Effort and Overdiag-
nosing
In this section study the problem of hidden diagnosis effort. In the previous
section we assumed that every expert received a signal for free. To study this
case, we assume that the expert has to invest effort to receive a signal. When-
ever the expert decides to diagnose a customer, he receives a signal as defined
above. Diagnosis triggers a cost of d per customer for the expert. Note, the
rational regarding the mark-up for the high quality treatment, namely that
∆ = 0 holds also for the case with diagnosis cost. The expert cannot charge
for diagnsosis in equilibrium, otherwise charging for the unobservable and
not provided diagnosis and providing always high quality leads to profits for
the expert.
Proposition 2 There exists no equilibrium with a positive diagnosis price
p.
Proof. Assume the opposite. Given that the expert cannot be forced to sell
below costs, i.e. p ≥ c, it is straightfoward that the following strategy would
yield positive profits for an expert: σ = 0 and always suggest c. Positive
profits cannot survive competition.
In equilibrium ∆ = 0 otherwise an entrant can refrain from investing in
diagnosis and make a positive profit by always selling c. This implies that
the mark-up for low quality must cover any payments t plus diagnosis cost.
That is ∆ = (1− α)t+ d. Iff (1− α)l + d > (c− c) + (1− α)v no diagnosis
will be provided in equilibrium because the expert cannot choose prices that
cover cost and customers follow the advice to buy low quality.
Let us now consider that the expert has a continuous choice of diagnosis
effort. The more effort she invests the more precise her signal. We assume
that the signal precision σ is not observable. Denote by d(σ) the costs a
diagnosis probability σ causes. To keep the problem interesting, we assume
that it is efficient to invest some effort but inefficient to the provide a perfect
diagnosis:
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d(σ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
= 0 for σ = 0
> 0 for 0 < σ ≤ 1
, (1)
d(σ)
dσ
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
= 0 for σ = 0
> 0 for 0 < σ ≤ 1
> c+ v for σ = 1
, (2)
d2(σ)
d2σ
> 0 and (3)
(1− h)(c− c) > h(v + c). (4)
The first three assumptions, ensure an interior solution for σ. The last as-
sumption ensures that without a signal it is better to provide the minor
treatment. Together these assumptions ensure that it is always efficient to
provide some diagnosis and to follow the signal observed.
Let us first characterize the efficient diagnosis effort.
Proposition 3 The efficient diagnosis effort is increasing in h, v and c and
implicitly characterized by d(σ)
dσ = h(v + c).
Proof. The efficient soltution is characterized as σ∗ =argmax
σ
hc + (1 −
h)c+h(1− σ)(v+c) + d(σ). Thus the first order condition is given as d(σ)
dσ =
h(v + c). Given d
2(σ)
d2σ > 0 it follows that an increase in h, v or c implies a
higher diagnosis effort.
To study the experts incentive, we describe the experts options given a
price vector (p, p, p) and a compensation payment t. The expert can either
(i) do not invest in diagnosis (σ = 0) and always provide c. His profit is
p+ p− c.
(ii) do not invest in diagnosis (σ = 0) can always provide c. His profit is
given as p+ p− c+ h(p− c)− ht.
(iii) choose some positve diagnosis effort (σ > 0) and follow the diagnosis
signal. His payoff in this case is given as p + (1 − hσ)(p − c) + h(p − c) −
h(1− σ)t− d(σ).
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Given profits are zero in equilibrium we can follow straight away that the
price for diagnosis and the mark-up for high quality must be zero. Given
that experts have an incentive to generate the highest rents for customers,
we find the following result for risk-neutral customers:
Proposition 4 If customers are risk neutral and l < (c−c)
1−α(σ∗)−v then experts
exert the efficient level of diagnosis effort and follow the diagnosis signal if
θ = v + c− l. Whenever θ is set externally higher (lower) than this critical
value then experts will invest too much (little) effort. If Experts are free to
choose θ then they will choose equal to the critical value.
Proof. Given p = ∆ = 0 in equilibrium ∆ = d(σ)
1−α(σ) + (1− α(σ))(θ + l) and
d(σ)
dσ = h(θ + l). For θ + l = v + c the choice of the expert is efficient. This
compensation payment can be supported, if customers are willing to buy low
quality when adviced to do so. Under these prices, customers prefer to buy
c if α(σ)v − c−∆+ (1− α(σ))θ ≥ v − c+∆⇐⇒ l ≤ (c−c)
1−α(σ) − v. From the
first order condition follows the result for too high or too low compensation
payments. Given that experts compete in maximizing rents for customers,
they will choose θ efficiently whenever possible.
We hence showed that for the case where experts compete for homoge-
neous customers, they will choose an efficient effort for diagnosis. But, if t is
not chosen endogenousely and it is unequal to v+p then inefficiencies arise
because experts effort is detemined by t.
If customers are risk averse, expert can raise customer utility by offering
highjj compensation payments, compensating at least partially for l. This
implies overdiagnosing customers.
5 Conclusions
We showed in a simple model of credence goods with experts that may misdi-
agnose major treatments as minor ones the effects of payments the expert has
to make in case of a treatment failure. A pure loss to both parties as a form
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of punishment for the expert is more likely to cause inefficiencies than a com-
pensation the expert pays to the customer. In any case too high payments
in case of failure will induce overtreatment to avoid the payment for sure.
Too low payments induce undertreatment because experts will not invest in
diagnosis and always sell low quality. Whenever the expert is free to choose a
compensation payment his incentives are such that he will set a compensation
that provides him with the incentive to treat customers efficiently.
With respect to medical malpractice awards our argument supports the
case against too high awards. These can lead to two types on inefficiency.
First it can lead to inefficient high effort invested in diagnosis time, i.e. a
physician invests too much time to one case (time that is missing for other
needed treatments) or too many (and too expensive) diagnostics checks are
applied. Second, it can lead to defensive medicine, i.e. treatments not needed
given diagnosis results are applied because they solve probable desease that
where not diagnosed due to misdaignosis. These results are due to the as-
sumption that courts cannot identify the diagnosis effort of a physician. If
this is perfectly possible, and efficient levels are easy to establish, then these
problems disappear.
With other expert services, a common policy is ”satisfaction guaranteed”.
Under this policy, consumers can come back when a treatment failed and
receive the necessary treatment for free. Our model predicts that this type
of consumer compensation is in general too low because it does not take into
account the consumers loss in the period when failure is detected. Therefore
the expert is provided with too little incentives to invest in diagnosis effort.
Many directions for further research remain. In Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2004, 2005b) we study the case where experts face heterogeneous customers
in situations where experts have market power and when they face compe-
tition by non-experts when consumers are able to switch sellers after having
received advice. We did not study the judicial process. One may ask whether
increased diagnosis effort will be recognized by courts as due care and then
experts may not be liable for failed treatments.
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